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Stimulus-induced response conflict (e.g., in Simon or Stroop tasks) is often reduced
after conflict trials—the Gratton effect. It is generally assumed that this effect is due
to a strengthening of the representation of the current intention or goal, which in turn
increases the degree of stimulus and/or response control. Recent evidence suggests
that the motivational signal driving the Gratton effect might be affective in nature. If
so, individual differences in either the strength of affective signals and/or the ability to
interpret such signals might explain individual differences in cognitive-control adjustments
as reflected in the Gratton effect. We tested this hypothesis by relating individual sizes
of the Gratton effect in a Simon task to scores on the affective and the cognitive
dimension of the Bermond/Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ)—which we assumed
to assess individual differences in affective-signal strength and ability to interpret affective
signals, respectively. Results show that the cognitive, but not the affective dimension
predicted control adjustment, while the accuracy of heartbeat detection was only (and
only weakly) related to online control. This suggests that the motivation to fine-tune one’s
cognitive-control operations is mediated by, and may depend on one’s ability to interpret
one’s own affective signals.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditional views on the role of motivation in action control have
focused on the process of decision-making, that is, on the selec-
tion of goals that an agent intends to pursue (e.g., Kahneman,
2011) and, in few cases, on the evaluation of performed actions
with respect to that goal (e.g., Miller et al., 1960; Achtziger and
Gollwitzer, 2008). According to this perspective, motivational
processes keep themselves busy with the “what” of actions and
provide action-control processes with information about wanted
action outcomes. More recent research has suggested a some-
what more complex picture, however—a picture indicating that
motivational processes also affect the “how” of action control.
A prime example is the so-called “conflict-adaptation effect”
or “Gratton effect” (the theoretically more neutral term, after
Gratton et al., 1992), that is observed in tasks where irrelevant
stimuli or stimulus features induce response conflict (such as
the Simon or Stroop task). Conflict-inducing trials (i.e., trials in
which the irrelevant stimulus or stimulus feature primes an incor-
rect response; i.e., response-incompatible trials) are known to
increase reaction times (RTs) and error rates (PEs) as compared to
neutral trials or trials in which stimuli prime the correct response
(compatible trials). The Gratton effect consists in the observation
that the size of such compatibility effects varies as a function of the
compatibility in the previous trial: the compatibility effect in the
present trial is commonly larger after a compatible trial than after
an incompatible trial (Gratton et al., 1992; Stürmer et al., 2002).
This observation has been taken to reflect the conflict-induced
adaptation of cognitive control (Botvinick et al., 2001): control
relaxes after a trial without conflict (i.e., after a compatible trial)
but is strengthened after a conflict trial (i.e., after an incompatible
trial), so that control is “hit” more by conflict after compati-
ble than incompatible trials. Even though there are reasons to
assume that the Gratton effect is not a pure measure of adaptivity
(Hommel et al., 2004; Schmidt and De Houwer, 2011), the cur-
rent understanding is that it does reflect control adaptations to
some degree (e.g., Verguts and Notebaert, 2009).
From a motivational point of view, the Gratton effect raises
two questions. First, why do people need to adapt the degree to
which they are controlling their actions at all? If they would keep
control at some optimum, adaptation should not be necessary.
The fact that they apparently do not suggests that they are either
unable to do that, perhaps because cognitive control relies on lim-
ited and quickly depleting resources (Baumeister, 2002), or not
willing to invest 100% of the available resources (De Jong et al.,
1999; Kool and Botvinick, 2014), perhaps because that would be
wasting energy in non-conflict trials. Indeed, several observations
indicate that people spontaneously reduce the amount of cogni-
tive effort they invest in a task over time and trials (De Jong et al.,
1999; Altmann, 2002; Kool and Botvinick, 2014; Kool et al., 2014),
which suggests the operation of an energy-saving motivational
process realizing a kind of “law of least effort” (Hull, 1943). Even
though most of the related research is rather recent, the general
idea that cognitive-control resources are flexibly tailored to the
task demands is an old one that goes back to Hillgruber’s (1912)
“difficulty law of motivation” (Brehm and Self, 1989; Hommel
et al., 2012).
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The second important motivational question is why people
increase the amount of cognitive resources they invest after con-
flict trials. Conventional motivational accounts would suggest
that control adaptation is driven by action errors, because these
would imply a mismatch between the selective goal and the actual
outcome, but not by mere conflict. This would allow for learn-
ing through errors but not for the prevention of errors through
the anticipatory adjustment of action-control parameters that the
Gratton effect is taken to reflect. According to Botvinick et al.
(2001), the necessity of control adjustments is signaled by the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which receives input represent-
ing the current degree of response conflict. In contrast, Holroyd
and Coles (2002) have emphasized the role of expected or actual
negative feedback in motivating control adjustments. Botvinick
(2007) pointed out that these two views might not be incompat-
ible if one assumes that conflict serves as a teaching signal for
avoidance-learning processes.
Interestingly, all three approaches imply that affective states
might be involved in driving control adjustments: Just like real
or anticipated negative events induce negative affect, conflict
between response tendencies has been assumed to have the exact
same effect (Festinger, 1957). This suggests that control adjust-
ments are driven by negative affect. Consistent with this pre-
diction, van Steenbergen et al. (2009, 2010, 2012a) found that
the Gratton effect is reliable after a negative-mood induction
or after trials providing unexpected financial loss, but absent
after positive-mood induction or unexpected reward. Along the
same lines, Holmes and Pizzagalli (2007) showed that participants
with high scores in depressive symptoms were associated with
impaired post-error and post-conflict performance adjustments.
Similarly, van Steenbergen et al. (2012b) found that, in depres-
sive patients, depressive symptoms induced by acute tryptophan
depletion were associated with increased conflict adaptation. It
is important to emphasize that in none of these studies were
the affective states related to actual action outcome, error rates,
or objective success. This means that affective states are not just
a byproduct of response conflict or the expectation of failure
but rather the actual motivational force that is driving action-
control adjustments. In other words, control adjustments seem
to be mainly driven by (negative) affect—or, more specifically, by
the (negative) sum of positive and negative affective signals (van
Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2010). If so, response conflict or nega-
tive event expectations can be considered just examples of means
to induce a negatively-biased affect state (see also Dreisbach and
Fischer, 2012).
If control adjustments would really be driven by negative
affect, one would expect that interindividual differences in
experiencing or processing affect predict differences in control
adjustments—and this was indeed the hypothesis we tested in the
present study. We considered two ways in which affect processing
might differ.
For one, people may differ with respect to the strength of
the signal that affect-related systems send to systems sensing the
need for control, such as the ACC. Indeed, Critchley et al. (2004)
reported that people’s accuracy in reporting their own heartbeat
was positively correlated with activation of their insular cortex—
a structure that integrates affective and motivational signals and
“reports” to the ACC (Craig, 2009; Critchley and Harrison, 2013).
Likewise, van Veen et al. (2009) found that the degree of attitude
change in a cognitive-dissonance task was positively correlated
with activation in the insular cortex. Hence, it might be that some
individuals generate stronger affective signals than others, so that
their action-monitoring systems would be more likely to pick up
signals indicating negative affect. As a consequence, these indi-
viduals would be expected to show a more pronounced Gratton
effect.
For another, people may differ with respect to the degree
that they are able to interpret signals sent by affect-related sys-
tems. Indeed, several authors have argued that affectively relevant
signals might often be difficult to interpret and people may dif-
fer with respect to their ability to attribute them to the actual
cause. For instance, Schachter (1971) provided evidence that eat-
ing behavior in obese individuals is triggered more by external,
environmental cues than in normal-weight people, who rely more
on internal, hunger-related signals—presumably because the for-
mer find it difficult to tell hunger-related from hunger-unrelated
signals. Along the same lines, Duncan and Laird (1997) reported
systematic differences between participants with respect to the
degree to which their mood was affected by facial-expression
manipulations: while some people felt happier when activating
affect-related facial muscles involved in smiling and more angry
when activating muscles involved in frowning, others were unaf-
fected by any manipulation. As the authors suggest, this might
reflect differences in the ability to interpret proprioceptive cues.
Applied to action control, these considerations suggest that peo-
ple could differ with respect to their ability to interpret internal
affective signals. If so, people who are more able to interpret such
signals should be more likely to identify negative affective states
and, thus, show a more pronounced Gratton effect.
In the present study, we used the Bermond/Vorst Alexithymia
Questionnaire (BVAQ; Vorst and Bermond, 2001) to assess indi-
vidual differences with respect to both the strength of affective
signals and the ability to interpret them. The BVAQ has two
major dimensions: an affective and a cognitive dimension. While
the affective dimension can be taken to reflect the perceived
intensity and frequency of affective signals (Wiens et al., 2000;
Herbert et al., 2007), the cognitive dimension assesses the degree
to which people engage in analyzing, identifying, and commu-
nicating their affective states (Silani et al., 2008; Bermond et al.,
2010). Accordingly, we hypothesized that a reliable correlation
between the affective BVAQ score and the individual size of the
Gratton effect would indicate a role of individual differences in
affective signal strength. In contrast (or in addition), a correlation
between the cognitive BVAQ score and the Gratton effect would
suggest a role of individual differences in the ability to interpret
affective signals. Another measure we considered was the indi-
vidual accuracy in a heartbeat-detection task (e.g., Pollatos and
Schandry, 2004). Asmentioned already, accuracy in such tasks has
been shown to correlate with the degree of insular-cortex activ-
ity (Critchley et al., 2004), suggesting that it might represent an
alternative measure of signal strength.
To investigate the adaptivity of cognitive control, we used
a standard conflict-inducing task, the Simon task (for reviews,
see Lu and Proctor, 1995; Hommel, 2011). The Simon effect is
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observed when people respond with spatially defined responses
to non-spatially defined features. If the location of the stimulus,
which is nominally irrelevant to the task, happens to correspond
to the location of the correct response, responses are quicker and
more accurate than if the locations of stimulus and response do
not match. The effect is commonly attributed to response con-
flict created by the automatic, stimulus-induced activation of the
incorrect response in stimulus-response-incompatible trials. The
Simon task has been shown to give rise to reliable Gratton effects
(Stürmer et al., 2002), which made it suitable for our purposes.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixty students (8 males; mean age 19.7 years) of the Leiden
University participated in the experiment for partial fulfillment of
course credit (6.50 Euro).Written informed consent was obtained
from all subjects; and the protocol was approved by the local
ethical committee (Leiden University, Institute for Psychological
Research).
PROCEDURE
Participants estimated their heartbeat and completed the ques-
tionnaire in a counterbalance order. Afterwards, they performed
the Simon task.
Heartbeat detection
Heartbeat detection was measured using the Mental Tracking
Method (e.g., Tsakiris et al., 2011), which has been widely-used to
assess interoceptive sensitivity, correlates highly with other heart-
beat detection tasks, and has good test-retest reliability (Knoll and
Hodapp, 1992). Participants were asked to remove any nail polish
and clean their finger with an alcohol swab. Heartbeat assess-
ment was measured with a finger type pulse oximeter (Contec
CMS50D+; accuracy = 2 bpm/2%). The display on the device
was taped off, making it unreadable to the participant. The device
was connected to the thumb of the participant’s non-dominant
hand and attached with a USB cable to a PC running Windows™.
Computer software was used to display and record (average)
heartbeat rate, not visible to the participant. Participants were
seated in a chair, in a still and relaxed position without speaking,
and instructed to report their pulse rate as detected by intero-
ception. Touching their wrist or other body parts that would
reveal their pulse was not allowed. Before measurement partici-
pants were seated without speaking for 2min, then a 15-s practice
trial was performed. The task consisted of four trials of different
duration (25, 35, 45, and 100 s), the sequence of which was ran-
domized, balanced, and unknown to the participant beforehand.
The experimenter indicated the beginning and end of the trial
by an aural (START/STOP) and visual (hand) signal. After each
trial participants were asked to verbally report what they thought
that their average heartbeat had been. No feedback was given on
performance. There was a 30 s rest interval between each trial.
BVAQ
A paper version of the Dutch BVAQ was used (Vorst and
Bermond, 2001). Participants replied to emotion-related state-
ments on 5-point Likert scales. The questionnaire consists of 40
questions assessing alexithymic tendencies on two dimensions:
cognitive and affective.
The cognitive dimension comprises of three subscales: verbal-
izing emotions, identifying emotions, and analyzing emotions.
The “verbalizing emotions” subscale concerns the degree to which
one is able or inclined to describe or communicate about one’s
emotional reactions (e.g., “I find it difficult to verbally express
my feelings”). The “identifying emotions” subscale concerns the
degree to which one is able to define one’s arousal states (e.g.,
“When I am distressed, I know whether I am afraid or sad or
angry”). The “analyzing emotions” subscale concerns the degree
to which one seeks out explanations of one’s own emotional reac-
tions (e.g., “I hardly ever go into my emotions”). Subscales have
8 questions each, scored from 1–5. Possible scores thus range
from 24–120 (8–42, clearly non-alexithymic; 43–61, modal; and
62–120, alexithymic).
The affective dimension comprises of two subscales: emotion-
alizing and fantasizing. The “emotionalizing subscale” concerns
the degree to which someone is emotionally aroused by emotion-
inducing events (e.g., “When something totally unexpected hap-
pens, I remain calm and unmoved”). The “fantasizing” subscale
concerns the degree to which someone is inclined to fantasize,
imagine, daydream, etc. (e.g., “Before I fall asleep, I make up all
kinds of events, encounters, and conversations”). Subscales have
eight questions each, scored from 1–5. Possible scores therefore
range from 16–80 (16–28, clearly non-alexithymic; 29–41, modal;
42–80, alexithymic).
Simon task
The Simon task was performed on a computer running
Windows™, attached to a 17′′ color monitor. Viewing dis-
tance was about 60 cm. A continuously centrally-displayed small
(0.5 cm) dark gray square served as fixation point. Stimuli were
green and blue circles (1.5 cm in diameter), presented to the left
or right of fixation. The color and location of the stimuli var-
ied randomly and equiprobably. Circles stayed on the screen until
1500ms had passed or a response was given. Intervals between
stimuli varied randomly between 1250–1750ms, in steps of
100ms. Feedback on PEs and RTs was provided at the end of each
block. Responses were made by pressing the “z” or “?” buttons of
the QWERTY computer keyboard with the left or right index fin-
ger, respectively. Participants were instructed to react as fast and
as accurate as possible to the stimulus-color, but not location.
Data analysis
As a manipulation check (to demonstrate reliable Simon and
Gratton effects), mean RTs and PEs from the Simon task were
submitted to separate repeated-measures ANOVAs, with com-
patibility in present trial (compatible vs. incompatible) and
compatibility in previous trial (compatible vs. incompatible) as
factors.
For the correlation analyses, seven scores were calculated: (1)
the size of the Simon effect in RT (RT incompatible in the
present trial minus RT compatible in the present trial); (2) the
size of the Simon effect in PE (incompatible minus compati-
ble); (3) the size of the Gratton effect in RT (Ci[incompatible
trial following compatible trial] – Cc[compatible trial following
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compatible trial]) – (Ii[incompatible trial following incompatible
trial] – Ic[compatible trial following incompatible trial]); (4) the
size of the Gratton effect in PE ((Ci – Cc) – (Ii– Ic)); (5) the BVAQ
score for the affective dimension (emotionalizing subscale + fan-
tasizing subscale, a higher score indicating more alexithymia);
(6) the BVAQ score for the cognitive dimension (verbalizing
subscale + identifying emotions subscale + analyzing subscale,
a higher score indicating more alexithymia); and (7) an inte-
roceptive awareness score, calculated from the four different
heartbeat detection intervals [¼(1 – (|recorded heartbeats–
counted heartbeats|)/recorded heartbeats)]; this score can vary
between 0 and 1, with higher scores indicating better heartbeat
detection.
RESULTS
HEARTBEAT DETECTION AND BVAQ
Judgment accuracy in heartbeat detection varied between 0.46
and 0.98 (Mean = 0.82, SD = 0.14).
The BVAQ scores varied between 25 and 78 (Mean = 51,
SD = 13) for the cognitive dimension, and between 18 and 60
(Mean = 36, SD = 9) for the affective dimension.
SIMON TASK (MANIPULATION CHECK)
As the Simon effect is sensitive to the overall RT level
(Hommel, 1993), participants with mean RTs exceeding
2.5 SD were excluded; this led to the exclusion of two par-
ticipants [females; Mean(Cognitive Dimension) = 50, SD = 4,
Mean(Affective Dimension) = 46, SD = 9]. As usually found, per-
formance on the Simon task was faster (375ms vs. 411ms),
F(1, 57) = 126.41, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.69, and more accurate (2.7
vs. 6.6%), F(1, 57) = 47.96, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.46, on compatible
than on incompatible trials. A standard Gratton effect was
obtained, as indicated by a significant interaction between
previous trial and present trial compatibility both for RTs,
F(1, 57) = 190.65, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.77, and PEs, F(1, 57) =
93.36, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.62. The Simon effect in RTs was signifi-
cant after compatible trials (65ms), F(1, 57) = 328.21, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.85, but not after incompatible trials (6ms), F = 2.49,
p = 0.12. For the PE data, a regular Simon effect (1.1 and 10.1%
in compatible and incompatible trials, respectively) was observed
after compatible trials, F(1, 57) = 110.41, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.66,
while a reverse, but not significant, effect was observed after
incompatible trials (4.3 and 3.0% in compatible and incompatible
trials, respectively), F(1, 57) = 3.71, p = 0.06, η2p = 0.06.
CORRELATION ANALYSES
As the correlation analyses had the goal to determine whether
alexithymia measures can predict existing Simon and Gratton
effects (rather than explaining their absence/inversion, an
issue beyond the scope of the present study), participants
with negative Simon or Gratton effects were excluded from
analysis; this led to the exclusion of three participants [2
females with a negative Simon effect and 1 male with a
negative Gratton effect; Mean(Cognitive Dimension) = 56, SD = 19,
Mean(Affective Dimension) = 44, SD = 12].
The BVAQ scores for the 55 participants included in the corre-
lation analyses varied between 25 and 78 (Mean = 50, SD = 13)
for the cognitive dimension, and between 18 and 60 (Mean = 35,
SD = 9) for the affective dimension.
Table 1 provides an overview of the correlations between the
two BVAQ dimensions (and their respective subscales) and our
critical measurements (i.e., heartbeat-detection score and the
Simon and the Gratton effects in terms of RTs and PEs). Notably,
the Gratton effect in RT was reliably predicted by the cogni-
tive (r = −0.37, p = 0.005), but not by the affective dimension
(r = −0.061, p = 0.66) of the BVAQ (see Figure 1). The signif-
icant correlation between the Gratton effect and the cognitive
dimension of the BVAQ was mainly due to two of the three
cognitive subscales: verbalizing (r = −0.37, p < 0.01), and ana-
lyzing (r = −0.28, p < 0.01). That is, the less people experience
problems in verbalizing and analyzing their emotions the more
likely they engage in adapting the degree of cognitive control
to task demands. To evaluate the robustness of these results,
we applied Bayesian statistic to the Pearson’s correlation coef-
ficients computed between the Gratton effect in RT and the
two BVAQ dimensions, to provide direct support for either the
null (H0) or the alternative (H1) hypothesis. To this end, we
used the Bayesian correlation method proposed by Wetzels and
Wagenmakers (2012; see also Liang et al., 2008) to compute the
Bayes factor (BF; Jeffreys, 1961)—an index that quantifies the rel-
ative plausibility of the data under the two competing hypotheses.
A BF greater than 1 represents evidence for H1, whereas a BF
smaller than 1 represents evidence for H0 (see Jeffreys, 1961, for
a coarse classification). Bayesian analyses confirmed our results.
Table 1 | Correlations between the two BVAQ dimensions (and their respective subscales) and the heartbeat-detection score, the Simon and
Gratton effects (in terms of RTs and errors).
Simon effect Simon effect error Gratton effect Gratton effect error Heartbeat perception
Cognitive dimension 0.207 −0.112 −0.370** −0.205 −0.081
Verbalizing 0.267* −0.117 −0.366** −0.238 −0.169
Identifying emotions 0.128 −0.046 −0.186 −0.132 0.096
Analyzing 0.012 −0.091 −0.282* −0.050 −0.114
Affective dimension 0.048 −0.022 −0.061 −0.190 −0.051
Emotionalizing 0.128 −0.129 −0.078 −0.124 −0.175
Fantasizing −0.021 0.054 −0.026 −0.156 0.048
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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FIGURE 1 | Scatterplots of the Gratton effect against BVAQ scores for the cognitive and affective dimensions. The BVAQ cognitive, but not the affective
dimension predicts the degree to which people adapt their cognitive control to task demands, as measured by the Gratton effect.
For the cognitive dimension, the analysis yielded a BF of 5.0—
substantial evidence for H1 (cf. Jeffreys, 1961). In contrast, for the
affective dimension, the analysis yielded a BF of 0.1–substantial
evidence for H0.
Interestingly, we observed only little evidence of a relation-
ship between the Simon effect and alexithymia scores: apart from
a just-significant positive correlation between the size of the
Simon effect in RTs and the verbalizing subscale of alexithymia
(r = 0.27, p = 0.049), none of the alexithymia subscales (nor the
cognitive and affective dimensions) correlated with this measure
(ps ≥ 0.13; see Table 1).
Also of interest, the heartbeat-detection score did not corre-
late with any of the alexithymia dimensions (or any subscale,
ps ≥ 0.20; see Table 1). Furthermore, this measure did not
correlate either with the Simon effects in RTs and PEs or the
Gratton effect in RTs (ps ≥ 0.28). However, a significant pos-
itive correlation between heartbeat detection and the Gratton
effect in PEs (r = 0.27, p = 0.043) suggested that more accurate
heartbeat detectors are more likely to engage in cognitive con-
trol adjustments aimed at preventing errors in conflict-inducing
trials.
Finally, we obtained positive correlations between the Simon
effects in RTs and PEs (r = 0.35, p < 0.01), and between the
Gratton effects in RTs and PEs (r = 0.31, p < 0.05).
DISCUSSION
The aim of our study was to better characterize the motiva-
tional signal driving cognitive-control processes to adapt to task
demands. Given the evidence that this signal is related to neg-
ative affect, we reasoned that people may differ with respect to
either the strength of the signal provided by affect-related neural
systems (such as the insular cortex; Critchley et al., 2004) or the
individual ability to interpret signals of that sort (e.g., Schachter,
1971). We assessed the adaptivity of cognitive control by means of
the Gratton effect in a Simon task and considered the affective and
cognitive dimensions of the BVAQ to reflect individual differences
in signal strength and interpretational abilities, respectively.
The outcome is clear in showing that individual differences
in the Gratton effect are associated with the cognitive, but not
the affective BVAQ dimension. This suggests that the ability or
preference to analyze and properly interpret affect signals is neces-
sary for engaging in adaptive control. It is important to point out
that the BVAQ assesses the subjective experience of difficulties in
analyzing and interpreting one’s own emotions but does not indi-
cate whether the individual interpretations are correct. Hence,
our findings do not rule out the possibility that people engage
in the trial-to-trial fine-tuning of cognitive control only because
they think they are good in interpreting their feelings while they
actually are not. If so, interpretational optimism might be par-
ticularly motivating for engaging in the optimization of control,
while the actual availability of interpretational skills might not
matter so much. And yet, given that life provides numerous occa-
sions to provide objective feedback about the validity of one’s
interpretation of one’s own emotions (Wittgenstein, 1977), it
makes sense to assume that the subjective responses to the BVAQ
do bear some relationship to the objective abilities. If so, this
would suggest that some degree of skill in interpreting one’s own
affective signals is necessary to exert efficient cognitive control or
at least diagnostic for the ability to do so.
One possibility is that the cognitive, perhaps even conscious,
interpretation of affective signals is a necessary processing step
intervening between the generation or emergence of conflict and
operations aiming at reducing or eliminating such conflict in
the future. Individuals who can interpret such signals more effi-
ciently, for instance by being better able to discriminate between
positive and negative signals, would thus be more effective in
adapting cognitive-control settings—as assessed by the Gratton
effect. Note that this would not necessarily mean that they can
avoid conflict in the first place, even though the positive correla-
tion between verbalizing and the Simon effect in PEs suggests that
they might to some degree.
It might be objected that, even though many studies in this
area suffer from problematic flaws that make the interpretation of
their outcomes difficult (Desender and Van den Bussche, 2012),
there is some evidence that conflict adaptation can occur in the
absence of conscious experience of the conflict-inducing stim-
uli (Desender et al., 2013; Reuss et al., 2014). However, note
that the lack of consciousness regarding the source of conflict-
induced affect does not necessarily imply the absence of conscious
experience of the resulting affective state: people do consciously
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experience affect even if that was induced by an unconscious
event (Winkielman et al., 2007). Hence, it might well be that
cognitive, perhaps even conscious interpretation of affective sig-
nals, is necessary to drive conflict adaptation. However, it would
be equally possible that conscious interpretation and (uncon-
scious?) conflict adaptation merely rely on the same information.
For instance, subcortical mechanisms might send affective signals
that vary in discriminability and diagnostic validity. Low discrim-
inability/diagnosticity would impair both conscious judgments
about one’s own affective state and the possibly unconscious,
automatic integration of affective signals for conflict adaptation.
Accordingly, measures of the former (as the cognitive alexithymia
scale) would correlate with assessments of the latter (as the
Gratton effect), even if affective judgment and conflict adaptation
would not causally impact each other. But even in that case, the
ability to consciously interpret one’s own affective states would
still be diagnostic of one’s conflict-adaptation abilities.
It is interesting to note that the heartbeat-detection score did
not correlate with any of the alexithymia scores. Previous find-
ings have shown that heartbeat detection accuracy is correlated
with the same measures as at least some alexithymia subscales
(e.g., activity in the insular cortex; see Critchley et al., 2004;
Silani et al., 2008; Herbert et al., 2011), which is why we con-
sidered a direct correlation between heartbeat detection scores
and alexithymia at least possible. The fact that we did not observe
such a correlation might suggest that the heartbeat-detection task
reflects different aspects of affective signal production than the
affective dimension of the BVAQ. Moreover, Wiens et al. (2000)
found that visceral perception plays a role in the experience of
the intensity of emotions. Given that the intensity of emotions is
related to the affective dimension of alexithymia, this may explain
why we found a correlation between the Gratton effect and the
cognitive scale of alexithymia, but not between the Gratton RT
effect and heartbeat detection (note that we did find a correlation
for Gratton PE effect). However, there are reasons not to over-
interpret the absence of a reliable correlation in a relatively small
sample, so that we are reluctant to draw strong conclusions. For
instance, the mean heartbeat detection accuracy in our study was
20% points higher than in previous studies (see Critchley et al.,
2004; Tsakiris et al., 2011), suggesting that our participants might
have been too good (i.e., produced a ceiling effect) to allow for a
reliable correlation.
In any case, our findings suggest that the individual motiva-
tion to engage in the fine-tuning of cognitive-control processes
is related to the perceived and/or objective ability to interpret
one’s own affective states. This provides further evidence for an
important role of emotion in the control of cognition and action,
and a deeper insight into the way cognitive control operations are
motivated. However, it is important to note that our results can
be generalized only to a population showing regular (i.e., posi-
tive) Simon and Gratton effects, and cannot be extended to the
individuals exhibiting uncommon negative effects.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
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